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THE "KINGDOM OF

ENDs": 1 IN

RE CINCINNATI

RADIATION LITIGATION AND THE RIGHT TO
BODILY INTEGRITY

The voluntary consent of the human subject is absolutely essential. This means that the person involved...
should have sufficient knowledge and comprehension of the
elements of the subject matter involved as to enable him to
make an understanding and enlightened decision ....
[T]here should be made known to him the nature, duration,
and purpose of the experiment; the methods and means by
which it is to be conducted; all inconveniences and hazards
reasonably to be expected; and the effects upon his health
and person which may possibly come from his participation
in the experiment.2
It is desired that no document be released which refers
to experiments with humans and might have adverse effects
on public opinion or result in legal suits. Documents covering such work should be classified "secret."3
I.

INTRODUCrION

On May 24, 1960, research doctors at the Cincinnati General
Hospital subjected J.W., an African-American man with cancer of
the left tonsil, to a dose of whole-body radiation.4 So began a

1. ALBERT CAMUS, THE REBEL 226 (1956).
2. United States v. Brandt (The Medical Case), 2 Trials of War Criminals Before the
Nuremberg Military Tribunal Under Control Council Law No. 10, 181 (1949) (judgment
delivered on July 19, 1947).
3. Vicki Allen, U.S. Radiation Test Secrecy Was Tied To PR, Not Security, CHICAGO
SUN-TIMES, December 16, 1994, at 36 (quoting 1947 memo from colonel with Atomic
Energy Commission Corps of Engineers).
4. General Hospital Radiation Experiments: A Chronology, CINCINNATI ENQUIRER,
April 11, 1994, at A4.
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series of human radiation experiments at the hospital stretching
almost eleven years, until May 19, 1971.' Funded by the Department of Defense, the experiments were undertaken to determine the
effects of radiation on the combat-readiness of soldiers.6 Specifically, the research doctors sought a "reliable, easy test for radiation
damage" 7 which would aid the military in determining what
amount of radiation exposure would reduce a soldier's "cognitive"
and other central nervous system functions below a minimum level
of effectiveness. 8
The research team, headed by Dr. Eugene Saenger, subjected
eighty-eight cancer patients to the experiments. 9 Although these
patients suffered from inoperable cancer, all were deemed to be in
"reasonably good clinical condition."'" For most, the radiation
treatments substantially shortened their lives." Ten died within
forty days, the median patient died within four-and-one-half
months, and the average patient survived six months. 2

5. Id.
6. The Defense Atomic Support Agency ("DASA"), now known as the Defense Nuclear Agency, allocated $651,000 to the research doctors at Cincinnati General Hospital
throughout the eleven-year experiment. Tim Bonfield, Radiation Testing: A Nation Investigates, CINCINNATI ENQUIRER, April 20, 1994, at Al. The 1966 Report prepared for
DASA by the researchers stated that "[p]sychological, hematological, metabolic, immunological and chromosomal findings [were] statistically analyzed and some implications concerning reduction in combat effectiveness of military personnel exposed to ionizing radiation [were] drawn." Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint at 24, In re Cincinnati Radiation Litig., 874 F. Supp. 796 (S.D. Ohio 1995) (Case No. C-1-94-126) [hereinafter
Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint) (quoting from the 1966 Report]. By exposing human subjects to single doses of whole or partial body radiation, the research doctors
sought to determine the effect of radiation on the "cognitive or other functions mediated
through the central nervous system." Id.
7. General Hospital Radiation Experiments: A Chronology, supra note 4, at A4.
8. Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint, at 24.
9. Paul Barton, Deadly Exposure: General Hospital's Atomic Secrets, CINCINNATI
ENQUIRER, July 29, 1994, at B2.
10. Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint, at 24.
11. The staff of the federal Advisory Committee on Human Radiation Experiments,
which President Clinton appointed to review Cold War experiments, characterized the
Cincinnati experiments as "bad science" and determined that the radiation exposures led to
quicker deaths "than [the patients] would [have] otherwise realize[d]." Paul Barton,
Saenger's UC Patients Not Told Of Risk, Panel Says, CINCINNATI ENQUIRER, November
15, 1994, at Al. In a presentation before the American Roentgen Ray Society on October
8, 1972, Dr. Saenger himself admitted that the radiation experiments might have caused
premature deaths. General Hospital Radiation Experiments: A Chronology, supra note 4, at
A4.
12. Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint, at 9-19. One of the class action patients,
not included in these calculations, survived the experiments because of a bone marrow
transplant from her twin sister. Id. at 18.
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Most importantly, the patients were informed of neither the risk
of death from the radiation experiments nor the likely side effects
resulting from exposure.' They were not even told they were participating in an experiment. For the first five years of the experiment, patients were told simply that the treatment would help their
sickness.' Written consent forms were used after 1965 but the
forms stated only that the patient was participating in a "'scientific
investigation' that would advance medicine and help mankind."' 5
Simply put, at no point during the eleven-year experiment did the
patients know what was happening to them.
Until February 3, 1994, their families were also kept in the
dark about the nature of the experiments and the patients' participation in them. Then, the Cincinnati Enquirer identified one participant in the radiation experiments, John "Joseph" Mitchell. 6 Soon
thereafter, the paper identified thirty-four others. 7 Deluged by
phone calls, the University of Cincinnati Medical Center eventually
confirmed the existence of the experiment and the involvement of
thirty-eight patients."
On February 17, 1994, the first proposed class action suit was
filed 9 against the research doctors individually, 0 the University
of Cincinnati, and the City of Cincinnati2' in Federal District
Court for the Southern District of Ohio. After three more suits
were filed, the plaintiffs consolidated their claims2 The class action plaintiffs, on behalf of the eighty-eight patients,23 asserted
13. Id. at 26-27.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Tim Bonfield, Wait for Truth Pains Daughter, CINCINNATI ENQUIRER, February 3,
1994, at Al.
17. General Hospital Radiation Experiments: A Chronology, supra note 4, at A4.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. The individual defendants are Drs. Eugene L. Saenger, Edward B. Silberstein, Bernard S. Aron, Harry Horwitz, James G. Kereiakes, Harold Perry, Ben I. Friedman, Thomas Wright, I-wen Chen, Robert L. Kunkel, Louis A. Gottschalk, Theodore H. Wold,
Golding G. Gleser, Warren 0. Kessler, and Myron I. Varon. Plaintiffs' Second Amended
Complaint, at 5-6.
21. Id. at 5.
22. Id.
23. The named plaintiffs are Gregory Shuff on behalf on Irene Shuff, Gloria Nelson on
behalf of Amelia Jackson, Katie Cruus on behalf of Louise Richmond, Joyce Slover on
behalf of Geneva Snow, Elyse Felrup on behalf of Rose Strohm, Mary Ann Houchins on
behalf of John Stillwell, Peggy Carbona on behalf of John Edgar Webster, Lillian Pagano
on behalf of Maude Jacobe, Zettie Smith on behalf of Lillie Wright, Otisteen Goodwin on
behalf of Estella Goodwin, Clifford Tidwell on behalf of James Tidwell, Joseph Kahr on
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that the defendants violated the patients' right to substantive and
procedural due process of law, their right to equal protection under
the law, their right to privacy, and their right to access to the
courts.24 Additionally, the plaintiffs alleged the violation of 42
U.S.C. § 1985' and 42 U.S.C. § 2011,26 the violation of an implied right of action arising -from a Defense Department directive
requiring compliance with the Nuremberg Code,27 a Bivens
claim,' and various pendent state claims.2 9

behalf of Margaret Bacon, Catherine 0. Hager on behalf of Joseph J. Mitchell, James
Nicholas on behalf of Mary Hampton Singleton, Lottie Wallace on behalf on Rosa Hayes,
Charles Davis on behalf of Charles Davis, Herbert L. Varin on behalf of Nina Cline,
Bertha Jungnickel on behalf of David Jungnickel, Lucien Bernard on behalf of Joseph P.
Larkins, Cyida C. Dudley on behalf of Booker T. Law, Doris Baer on behalf of Gertrude
Newell, Clarence Bunch on behalf of Franklin Bunch, Gregory Plair on behalf of Beatrice
Plair, Roberta Cure on behalf of Minnie Mae Johnson, Audrey Figgs on behalf of Maggie
Mitchell, Barbara Ann Mathis on behalf of Lula Tarlton, Willa Woodson on behalf of
Willie Williams, Deborah Kramer on behalf of Louis Romine, Donna White Christy, Viola
Reid on behalf of Mary Laws, Wanda Mattingly on behalf of Flonnie Wells, James Wilson on behalf of Necie Wilson, and Robert Conyers on behalf of Elizabeth Conyers.
Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint, at 1-5.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 41-42.
26. Id. at 42-43.
27. Id. at 52-56. The Nuremberg Code was formulated by the Nuremberg Tribunal
after World War II. The Code was articulated in a court opinion judging 23 Nazi physicians guilty of "crimes against humanity" for their experimentation on humans during the
war. United States v. Brandt (The Medical Case), 2 Trials of War Criminals Before the
Nuremberg Military Tribunal Under Control Council Law No. 10, 181 (1949). The first
provision in the Code states:
The voluntary consent of the human subject is absolutely essential.
This means that the person involved should have legal capacity to give consent;
should be so situated as to be able to exercise free power of choice, without
the intervention of any element of force, fraud, deceit, duress, over-reaching, or
other ulterior form of constraint or coercion; and should have sufficient knowledge and comprehension of the elements of the subject matter involved as to
enable him to make an understanding and enlightened decision. This latter
element requires that before the acceptance of an affirmative decision by the
experimental subject there should be made known to them the nature, duration,
and purpose of the experiment; the method and means by which it is to be
conducted; all inconveniences and hazards reasonably to be expected; and the
effects upon his health or person which may possibly come from his participation in the experiment.
The duty and responsibility for ascertaining the quality of the consent
rests upon each individual who initiates, directs or engages in the experiment. It
is a personal duty and responsibility which may not be delegated to another
with impunity.
Id. at 181-82.
28. A Bivens claim is a cause of action for damages arising from a federal official's
unconstitutional conduct. Bivens v. Six Unknown Names Agents of the Fed. Bureau of
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On June 2, 1994, the individual defendants moved to dismiss

the suit." They claimed that they enjoyed qualified immunity with
respect to the § 1983 claims and alleged that the plaintiffs failed to
properly assert the necessary elements of a claim under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1985 or 42 U.S.C. § 2011.' After arguments on the motion,
District Court Judge Sandra Beckwith denied the motion to dismiss
as to the § 1983 and § 1985 claims but dismissed the plaintiffs'
claims under 42 U.S.C. § 2011 and the implied right of action. 2
This Comment will focus on the asserted substantive due process claim under § 1983-namely, that the defendants violated the
patients' right to bodily integrity by subjecting them to the radiation experiments without obtaining their informed consent. First,
not only is the right to bodily integrity of central importance in
this case, but it also stands as the paradigmic inquiry by which
similar Cold War human experiments must be judged. Second,

Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 388 (1971). In In re Cincinnati Radiation Litigation, the plaintiffs brought this claim against Drs. Kessler and Varon, who oversaw the radiation experiments for the Department of Defense. Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint, at 42.
29. Plaintiffs assert claims for relief for abnormally dangerous activity, medical malpractice, negligence, negligent infliction of emotional distress, intentional or reckless infliction of emotional distress, battery, and fraud. Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint, at
44-51.
30. Motion to Dismiss on Behalf Of Defendants Saenger, Silberstein, Aron, Horwitz,
Kereiakes, Perry, Friedman, Kunkel, and Gleser, In re Cincinnati Radiation Litig., 874 F.
Supp. 796 (S.D. Ohio 1995) (Case No. C-1-94-126) [hereinafter Motion to Dismiss on
Behalf of Defendants].
31. Id. at 1-2. Arguing that the plaintiffs stated no cognizable federal claims, the defendants also moved to dismiss the supplemental state claims under Rule 12(b)(1) for lack
of subject matter jurisdiction. Id. at I.
32. In re Cincinnati Radiation Litig., 874 F. Supp. at 801.
33. Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint, at 41-2; Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Opposition to Individual Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, at 11-26, In re Cincinnati Radiation
Litig., 874 F. Supp. 796 (S.D. Ohio 1995) (No. C-1-94-126) [hereinafter Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Opposition].
34. The Department of Energy and its forerunner, the Atomic Energy Commission,
alone conducted 154 Cold War radiation experiments on 9000 people. Gary Lee, U.S.
Energy Agency Radiation Involved 9,000, Study Says, WASHINGTON PoST, February 10,
1995, at A13 (citing Human Radiation Experiments, the Department of Energy Roadmap
to the Story and the Records, a Department of Energy study). These included mental
patients in San Francisco who were given doses of iodine 131 to determine its effects on
their thyroid glands, infants with respiratory problems who were given blood mixed with
chromium 50 at Vanderbilt University, and 18 people aged 6 to 50, some completely
healthy, who were given milk laced with radioactive iodine at the University of Rochester
in 1963. Id. One of the children in this experiment developed thyroid cancer. Id. From
1960 to 1970, prisoners at the Oregon State Prison had their testicles irradiated to determine the effects of radiation on U.S. astronauts. Gary Lee, Prisoner Irradiation Probed;
Tests Were Among Riskiest Of Cold War Era, WASHINGTON POST, November 20, 1994, at
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the exploration of this right, in the context of the Cold War experiments, instructs us in the temptations and dangers of willful blindness. In one of history's many paradoxes, this Anglo-American
right received its clearest expression, in the military tribunals of
Nuremberg, at the same time that its proponents directed its most
egregious infringement.
Part II of this Comment will examine in detail the district
court's discussion of the right to bodily integrity.35 Part III will
then determine the validity of the court's holding in In re Cincinnati Radiaiion Litigation by looking to: 1) the current judicial
decisions regarding the right to bodily integrity;36 2) the origins of
this right in the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments and its judicial
development through 1972; 37 and, 3) the dictates of the
Nuremberg Code. 8 This Comment concludes that the right to
bodily integrity, far from being a novel constitutional claim, forms
a central component of our substantive due process jurisprudence
and that the defendants, by subjecting the plaintiffs to radiation
experiments without their consent, clearly violated this right. 9
II.

IN RE CINCINNATI RADIATION LITIGATION

In their motion to dismiss, the defendants asserted that they
were entitled to qualified immunity from the plaintiffs' § 1983
claims.' With respect to the substantive due process claim specifi-

Al. Radiation experiments similar to those performed at Cincinnati General Hospital occurred at 38 institutions nationwide. Barton, supra note 9, at Bi. In a particularly egregious experiment, currently the subject of litigation, plaintiffs allege that research doctors
at Vanderbilt University Hospital fed 829 pregnant women a tracer dose of radioactive
iron and then followed up to determine the morbidity and mortality experiences of the
mothers and their children. Craft v. Vanderbilt Univ., No. 3:94-0090, (M.D. Tenn. December 22, 1994). The Department of Defense, which funded the Cincinnati experiments, has
yet to declassify all of its files regarding radiation experiments. Lee, supra, at A13.
35. See infra notes 40-120 and accompanying text.
36. See infra notes 121-128 and accompanying text.
37. See infra notes 129-158 and accompanying text.
38. See infra notes 159-164 and accompanying text.
39. See infra part IV.
40. Motion to Dismiss on Behalf of Defendants, at 1. The doctrine of qualified immunity shields public officials from liabilities as long as their "actions could reasonably have
been thought consistent with the rights they are alleged to have violated." Anderson v.
Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 638 (1987). Designed to strike a balance "between the interests
in vindicating of citizens' constitutional rights and in public officials' effective performance of their duties," Davis v. Sherer, 468 U.S. 183, 195 (1984), qualified immunity
extends protection to the conduct of public officials unless: 1) the conduct at issue was
outside the scope of their discretionary functions or 2) the right alleged to be violated
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cally, they argued: 1) that the defendants, as "publicly employed
physicians," acted within the scope of their discretionary duties in
conducting the radiation experiments;4" 2) that the plaintiffs failed
to allege the violation of substantive due process under current
law;4' and, 3) that the contours of the right to bodily integrity
were not "clearly established" at the time of the radiation experiments so that the defendants would understand that they were
violating the plaintiffs' rights.43
In denying the defendants' motion to dismiss, the district court
rejected the defendants' assertions and affirmed the Fourteenth
Amendment's protection of the right to bodily integrity. The court
characterized the substantive due process claim as the right to be
free from "nonconsensual invasive medical experimentation by state
actors."" Under current law, it found a clear expression of this
right in a line of cases culminating in Washington v. Harper,
which recognized that "the forcible injection of medication into a
nonconsenting person's body represents a substantial interference
with that person's liberty."'45 Referring to the principles of liberty
and autonomy implicit in the Constitution, the judicial development
of substantive due process, and the common law informed consent
doctrine, the court further held that this right was "clearly established" at the time of the radiation experiments."

was clearly established at the time of conduct. Anderson, 483 U.S. at 640. In order for a
right to be "clearly established," the "contours of the right must be sufficiently clear that
a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that sight" Id. A
court in the Sixth Circuit relies on decisions of the Supreme Court, courts of its own
circuit, and the highest state court in which its sits to determine whether the right is
clearly established. Walton v. City of Southfield, 995 F.2d 1331, 1336 (6th Cir. 1993).
41. Reply Memorandum in Support of the Individual Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, at
11, In re Cincinnati Radiation Litig., 874 F. Supp. 796 (S.D. Ohio 1995) (Case No. C-194-126) [hereinafter Defendants' Reply Memorandum].
42. Id. at 3.
43. Id.at 8-12.
44. In re Cincinnati Radiation Litig., 874 F. Supp. at 810.
45. Id. at 812-14. (quoting Washington v. Harper 494 U.S. 210, 229 (1990)). In support of its assertion, the court also cited Riggens v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127 (1992) (holding that forced administration of antipsychotic medication during trial violated Fourteenth
Amendment); Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307 (1991) (holding that the government
has a duty to protect involuntarily committed mental patients from assault); Winston v.
Lee, 470 U.S. 753 (1985) (holding that forcible incision into robbery suspect's chest to
recover bullet was unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment absent compelling need);
Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480 (1980) (holding that transfer to mental hospital with mandatory behavior modification treatment implicated liberty interests).
46. In re Cincinnati Radiation Litig., 874 F. Supp. at 814-19. Most surprisingly, the
court held that the defendants, in conducting the radiation experiments, exceeded the scope
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Current Law

In its analysis of currently applicable law, the court relied
heavily on a line of prisoners' rights cases culminating in Washington v. Harper.7 In Washington, the Supreme Court held that state
prison officials could administer antipsychotic drugs to a prisoner
against his will only if: 1) the prisoner posed a danger to himself
and others, 2) the treatments were in his medical interest, and 3)
the prisoner received adequate procedural safeguards.' Importantly, the Court in Washington explicitly recognized that the prisoner
"possesse[d] a significant liberty interest in avoiding the unwanted
administration of [the] drugs
under the Due Process Clause of the
49
Fourteenth Amendment.
Analogizing the nonconsensual invasion in Washington to the
radiation experiments, the district court held that the plaintiffs in In
re Cincinnati Radiation Litigation possessed this same right to
bodily integrity against nonconsensual medical invasions by the
state." Although the defendants had attempted to characterize the
plaintiffs as "voluntary consumers of medical service," who could
constitutionally "be forced to choose between leaving the hospital
and accepting treatment,"'" the court rejected this contention on
two grounds. First, it held that it could not conclude before discovery that the plaintiffs, alleged to have been poor, were voluntary
patients." Second, the court held that the plaintiffs "never possessed knowledge sufficient to make [a] choice" between leaving or
participating in the radiation experiments.53 By misleading the
plaintiffs as to the true nature of the experiments, the court stated
that the defendants accomplished54 the equivalent of forcible seizure
"through canard and deception."
After establishing the plaintiffs' right to bodily integrity, the

of their discretionary duties and so did not even meet the threshold requirement for qualified immunity. The court, characterizing the defendants' delegated powers as "car[ing] for
the sick and injured," held that the defendants "act[ed] as scientists interested in nothing
more than assembling cold data for use by the Department of Defense." Id. at 814.
47. 494 U.S. 210 (1990).
48. Id. at 226-233.
49. Id. at 221-22.
50. In re Cincinnati Radiation Litig., 874 F. Supp. at 812.
51. Defendants' Reply Memorandum at 11 (quoting Rogers v. Okin, 634 F.2d 650, 661
(1st Cir. 1980)).
52. In re Cincinnati Radiation Litig., 874 F. Supp. at 811.
53. Id. at 812.
54. Id.
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court then balanced this liberty interest against the state's interest
in proceeding with the radiation experiments."5 Reviewing Winston
8 the court
v. Lee, 6 Washington," and Schmerber v. California,2
determined that state infringements on a person's bodily integrity
have been upheld only "on a showing of clear necessity, procedural
'
The court could find none of
regularity, and minimal pain."59
these justifications in the radiation experiments.' By not obtaining
their informed consent before subjecting the plaintiffs to the experiments, the defendants offered the plaintiffs no procedural safeguards such as the prisoner enjoyed in Washington. 6' Additionally,
the defendants' invasive radiation experiments subjected the plaintiffs to severe pain and even death with no showing of medical
necessity. 6' Therefore, the court held that, under current law, the

plaintiffs had stated a cognizable substantive due process claim.63
B.

Clearly Established Right

In rejecting the second prong of the defendants' qualified immunity defense, the court next demonstrated that the right to bodily
integrity was clearly established at the time of the radiation experiments.64 It grounded the existence of this right in the principles of
liberty and autonomy implicit in the Constitution,' the judicial
development of substantive due process,' and the common law
informed consent doctrine.67 The court then delineated the con55. Id. at 813-14.
56. 470 U.S. 753 (1985).
57. 494 U.S. 210 (1990).
58. 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
59. In re Cincinnati Radiation Litig., 874 F. Supp. 796, 813 (S.D. Ohio 1995) (Case
No. C-1-94-126). In Winston v. Lee, 470 U. S. 753, 766 (1985), the Supreme Court held
that absent a "compelling need," a state could not perform surgery on a robbery suspect
simply to recover a bullet for evidentiary purposes. In Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S.
210, 216 (1990), the Supreme Court held that an administrative procedure in which a
prisoner was informed of the prison's decision to administer antipsychotic drugs followed
by a hearing where the prisoner could attend, bring evidence, and receive the assistance
of a lay advisor provided the prisoner with the procedural regularity necessary to protect
his liberty interest. Finally, in Schierber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 771 (1966) the
Court upheld the nonconsensual administration of a blood test partly because it involved
"virtually no risk, trauma, or pain" and was performed by a physician.
60. In re Cincinnati Radiation Litig., 874 F. Supp. at 814.
61. See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
62. In re Cincinnati Radiation Litig., 874 F. Supp. at 814.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 814-19.
65. Id. at 814-15.
66. Id. at 816.
67. In re Cincinnati Radiation Litig., 874 F. Supp. 796, 816-17 (S.D. Ohio 1995)
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tours of the right to bodily integrity68 by examining the Supreme
Court's treatment of nonconsensual invasive medical procedures in
Jacobson v. Massachusetts,69 Skinner v. Oklahoma," Rochin v.
72
California,7 and Schmerber v. California.
1. Origins
In its constitutional analysis, the court simply stated that "the
plain language of the Constitution"73 prevents government officials
from "arbitrarily depriv[ing] unwitting citizens of their liberty and
their lives."74 The court buttressed its assertion by pointing to the
primary position that individual autonomy occupied in the ideology
of the Framers.7' The court noted that the American revolutionaries always regarded "the exercise of coercive power by the sovereign [as] suspect"7 6 and, with the Bill of Rights, explicitly sought
to limit state power.7 Further, the court relied upon Lockean philosophy which recognizes, as a central principle, "'a certain minimum area of personal freedom which must on no account be vio-

lated.

78

As a lodestar for its substantive due process analysis, the court
placed great emphasis on Meyer v. Nebraska's 9 definition of "liberty" within the due process clause as including the right "to enjoy
those privileges long recognized at common law as essential to the
orderly pursuit of happiness by free men."8 Citing Ingraham v.
Wright,8 the court identified one of these "historic liberties" as
the "right to be free from ... unjustified intrusions on personal
security."" Then, analogizing the right to bodily integrity to the

(Case No. C-1-94-126).
68. Id. at 817-19.
69. 197 U.S. 29 (1905).
70. 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
71. 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
72. 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
73. In re Cincinnati Radiation Litig., 874 F. Supp. 796, 815 (S.D. Ohio 1995) (Case
No. C-1-94-126).
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. In re Cincinnati Radiation Litig., 874 F. Supp. 796, 815 (S.D. Ohio 1995) (Case
No. C-1-94-126) (quoting ISAIAH BERLIN, FouR ESSAYS ON LIBERTY 124 (1969)).
79. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
80. Id. at 399.
81. 430 U.S. 651. (1977).
82. Id. at 673.
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recognized right to privacy in matters of procreation,83 the court
defined both as "constitutionally protected autonomy rights. 84
Finally, the court found support for the right to bodily integrity
by looking to the common law doctrine of informed consent."
Although acknowledging that the usual remedy for failing to obtain
informed consent lay in tort, the court recognized that the basis of
the doctrine was the right of "'[e]very human being . . . to determine what shall be done with his own body."'86 The court then
found that the defendants' intentional violation of the informed
consent doctrine infringed upon this right to self-determination and
since this violation was achieved through the coercive power of the
state, it necessarily implicated the Due Process Clause.87
2.

Contours

After establishing the existence of the right to bodily integrity
at the time of the radiation experiments, the court delineated the
contours of that right by examining the Supreme Court's treatment
of nonconsensual invasive medical procedures in four cases stretching from 1905 to 1965.88 By comparing the nonconsensual state
invasions found permissible in these cases with those found impermissible, the court concluded that, because of the severe consequences of the radiation experiments, the defendants should have
known that the experiments violated the plaintiffs right to bodily
89

integrity.

Through its analysis, the court determined that nonconsensual
invasive medical procedures were permissible at the time of the
radiation experiments only if the intrusions were "'minor ' ' ' " and
necessary to fulfill a compelling state interest.9 ' The court first
looked to Jacobson v. Massachusetts' which recognized "a sphere
within which the individual may assert the supremacy of his own

83. In re Cincinnati Radiation Litig., 874 F. Supp. 796, 816 (S.D. Ohio 1995) (Case
No. C-1-94-126).
84. Id.
85. Id. at 816-17.
86. Id. at 816 (quoting Schloemdorff v. Society of New York Hosp., 105 N.E.2d 92,
93 (N.Y. 1914)).
87. Id. at 817.
88. In re Cincinnati Radiation Litig., 874 F. Supp. 796, 817-19 (S.D. Ohio 1995)
(Case No. C-1-94-126).
89. Id.
90. Id. at 819 (quoting Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 771 (1966)).
91. Id. at 818 (quoting Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 29, 33 (1905)).
92. 197 U.S. 29 (1905).
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will"'93 against the state's invasion of his bodily integrity but nevertheless upheld a Massachusetts statute mandating the compulsory
vaccination of its adult population to prevent the spread of smallpox. 94 The district court was careful to point out that the Jacobson court only allowed this nonconsensual invasion because of the
"imminent danger"'95 of a smallpox epidemic.' Additionally, it
noted that Jacobson expressly declined to decide whether a compulsory vaccination which would "seriously impair [the] health"
of an individual would be similarly upheld. 9 The court then noted
that Schmerber v. California," decided sixty years later, echoed
Jacobson's ruling that an invasive medical procedure must be
"'minor...0 and performed "'under stringently limited condil10
tions.
In contrast, the court determined that the impermissible
nonconsensual medical procedures involved "extremely invasive"
procedures which "produced lasting side effects."'0 ' In establishing these outside boundaries to the right to bodily integrity, the
court cited Rochin v. People of California"2 and Skinner v. State
of Oklahoma. 3 In so doing, the court placed great emphasis on
Rochin's "shocks the conscience"'" 4 standard. It held that, similar
to the forcible stomach-pumping in Rochin,0 5 the defendants'
subjection of unwitting cancer patients to the radiation experiments
amounted to an "extremely invasive" procedure."0 Further, like
the sterilization of felons at issue in Skinner,"0 the radiation ex-

93. Id. at 33.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. In re Cincinnati Radiation Litig., 874 F. Supp. 796, 818 (S.D. Ohio 1995) (Case
No. C-1-94-126).
97. Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 29, 39 (1905).
98. In re Cincinnati Radiation Litig., 874 F. Supp. at 818.
99. 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
100. In re Cincinnati Radiation Litig., 874 F. Supp. at 819 (quoting Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 771 (1966)).
101. Id.
102. 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
103. 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
104. Rochin, 342 U.S. at 172.
105. In Rochin, the police took a suspect to the hospital and forced the suspect, against
his will, to have his stomach pumped in order to recover two tablets of a suspected
illegal narcotic. Id. at 166.
106. In re Cincinnati Radiation Litig., 874 F. Supp. 796, 819 (S.D. Ohio 1995) (Case
No. C-1-94-126).
107. In Skinner, the Supreme Court overturned an Oklahoma statute that would have
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periments "produced lasting side effects" such as "bone marrow
failure" and premature death.' °5 The court concluded that Rochin
especially "sent an unmistakable message to government officials
that needlessly severe intrusions of an individual's body, even if
that individual was a felon and stripped of most of his liberty,

were impermissible under the Due Process Clause."'"' 9
C. Nuremberg Code

Finally the court recognized the dictates of the Nuremberg
Code" ' as a cognizable standard of due process protection under
the United States Constitution. In its analysis, the court relied on
three separate grounds in deciding that the Code incorporated constitutional notions of due process. First, the court reviewed the
history of the Nuremberg "Medical Case.""' Noting that the case
was tried by two American lawyers" 2 before a panel of American
judges,"' the court suggested that constitutional due process standards must have played an implicit role in the tribunal's development of the standards necessary to ensure justifiable human experimentation." 4 Additionally, the court found the adoption of the
guidelines of the Nuremberg Code by the Department of Defense
and the National Institutes of Health to be further support of its

required the forced sterilization of repeat felony offenders. Skinner, 316 U.S. at 536.
108. In re Cincinnati Radiation Litig., 874 F. Supp. at 819.
109. Id. at 818.
110. Supra note 27.
111. Supra note 27.
112. The prosecution team consisted of Supreme Court Justice Robert L. Jackson and
Brigadier General Telford Taylor, a military attorney. Photos and Exhibits, THE NAZI
DOCTORS AND THE NUREMBERG CODE 111 (George J. Annas & Michael A. Grodin eds.,
1992).
113. The judges were Harold L. Sebring, justice of the Supreme Court of Florida; Walter B. Beals, justice of the Supreme Court of Washington; and Johnson T. Crawford,
former justice of the Oklahoma District Court. Id. at 113.
114. In re Cincinnati Radiation Litig., 874 F. Supp. 796, 821-22 (S.D. Ohio 1995)
(Case No. C-1-94-126). Throughout the case, the American prosecutors emphasized the
"fundamental and inescapable obligation of every physician under any known system of
law not to perform a dangerous experiment without the subject's consent." Taylor, Opening Statement of the Prosecution December 9, 1946, in THE NAZI DOCTORS AND THE
NUREMBERG CODE, supra note 112, at 89. The judges, charged with applying the "principles of the law of nations as they result from the usages established among civilized
peoples, [and] from the laws of humanity," held that not only "moral and ethical," but
also "legal concepts" mandated the consent of the subjects of human experimentation.
United States v. Brandt (The Medical Case), 2 Trials of War Criminals Before the
Nuremberg Military Tribunal Under Control Council Law No. 10, 181 (1949).
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constitutional significance." 5
Lastly, the court cited Justice O'Connor's dissent in United
States v. Stanley"6 as persuasive authority in this case. In Stanley,
a former serviceman brought suit against the Army because, while
in the service, he was secretly given dosages of LSD. 17 The Supreme Court held that Stanley could not obtain money damages
from the Army on the grounds that his injuries "ar[o]se out of or
were in the course of activity incident to service."".. In dissent,
O'Connor posited that "our Constitution's promise of due process
of law guarantees" that individual's receive the protections elucidated in the Nuremberg Code." 9 The district court, noting that the
plaintiffs in In re Cincinnati Radiation Litigation were citizens
rather than soldiers, was convinced that O'Connor's dissent should
control.'20
Ed.
A.

ANALYSIs

Current Law

The In re Cincinnati Radiation Litigation decision is solidly
grounded in current law. Washington v. Harper' and its predecessors clearly recognize an individual's liberty interest in avoiding
nonconsensual invasive medical procedures such as the radiation
experiments performed upon the plaintiffs in this case.
Given
the absence of any procedural safeguards to protect the plaintiffs
and the severe injuries they suffered for no necessary medical
reason, it also seems clear that the defendants can offer no compelling justification for their conduct."2
Additionally, although the Washington line of cases all involve
incarcerated or involuntarily committed individuals,'2 4 the
defendants' attempt to distinguish In re Cincinnati Radiation Litigation because of the supposed voluntary presence of the plaintiffs

115. In re Cincinnati Radiation Litig., 874 F. Supp. at 821.
116. 483 U.S. 669 (1987).
117. Id. at 671.
118. Id. at 684.
119. Id. at 710 (O'Connor, J.,dissenting).
120. In re Cincinnati Radiation Litig., 874 F. Supp. 796, 822 (S.D. Ohio 1995) (Case
No. C-1-94-126).

121. 494 U.S. 210 (1990).
122. See supra notes 47-54 and accompanying text.
123. See supra notes 55-63 and accompanying text.
124. See supra notes 47-49 and accompanying text.
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in Cincinnati General Hospital simply ignores the fundamental
requisites of informed consent. As an exercise of individual autonomy, informed consent requires that a person act: 1) intentionally;l 2) with an understanding of his or her action," and; 3)
free from controls that "rob the person of self-directedness."'
Viewed from this perspective, the defendants in In re Cincinnati
Radiation Litigation simply replaced the control restraints imposed
by incarceration with control restraints effected through an intentional concealment of the risks associated with the radiation experiments. To the extent that this concealment deprived the plaintiffs
of any true understanding of their situation, the defendants' conduct
constituted an even more severe state invasion than that at issue in
Washington.m
B.

Clearly Established Law

However, the crucial issue in In re Cincinnati Radiation Litigation is whether the right to be free from nonconsensual invasive
medical procedures was clearly established at the time of the radiation experiments. To determine this, this Comment will examine
the origins of the right to bodily integrity 2 9 and the contours of
this right at the time of the experiments. 3 '
1. Origins
An examination of the Framers' intent in adopting the Fifth
Amendment reveals the validity of the court's assertion that the
plain language of the Due Process clause and the principles of
liberty and autonomy implicit in the Constitution establish the
substantive right to bodily integrity. For the drafters of the Constitution, the Bill of Rights was the "repository" of values traditionally granted Englishmen by the principles of the Magna Carta and
"the Petition of Right.''

125. RuTH R. FADEN & TOM L. BEAUCHAMP, A HISTORY AND THEORY OF INFORMED
CONSENT 238 (1986) (defining an intentional act as one of which the actor is the "author

or agent").
126. Id. at 248.
127. Id. at 256.
128. In Washington, the prisoner at least was notified of the prison's intention to administer antipsychotic drugs. 494 U.S. 210, 216 (1990).
129. See infra notes 131-144 and accompanying text.
130. See infra notes 145-154 and accompanying text.
131. See A.E. Dick Howard, Rights In Passage: English Liberties In Early America, in
THE BILL OF RIGHTS AND THE STATES, 3, 11 (Patrick P. Conley & John P. Kaminsld
eds., 1992.)
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Fundamental among these was the right to personal security. In
his Commentaries, Blackstone recognized this right, which he characterized as the protection of "a person's . . enjoyment of his
life, his limbs, his body, [and] his health
from such practices
as may prejudice or annoy it," as part of "that residuum of natural
liberty" upon which the government may not intrude.'32 Sir Edward Coke, as well, recognized the substantive protections arising
from the Magna Carta's
guarantee of "lawful judgment ... [by]
' 33
land."'
the
of
the law
An examination of the debates leading up to the ratification of
the Bill of Rights demonstrates the Framers' reliance on
Blackstone's and Coke's formulation of due process rights and
their enshrinement in the Fifth Amendment. Throughout the debates, echoes of Blackstone abound. 34 Richard Henry Lee argued
for ratification in order to "secure ... that residuum of human
rights, which is not intended to be given up to society.' 1 35 Another commentator stated that a Bill of Rights was essential to guard
"against the invasion of those liberties which it is essential for us
to retain."' 6 Most tellingly, the language of the Fifth Amendment, itself, with its protection of "life, liberty, and property" mirrors Blackstone's formulation of natural rights. 37 Given this evidence, the court's argument that the right to bodily integrity received constitutional protection
from the creation of the Fifth
3
Amendment is compelling.' 1
The Supreme Court's longstanding recognition of autonomy
rights and the common law informed consent doctrine both evi-

132.

1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES,

*129, *134.

133. See Robert E. Riggs, Substantive Due Process in 1791, 1990 Wis. L. REV. 941,
958-963 (quoting chapter 39 of the Magna Carta).
134. Id. at 971 (citing evidence showing that Blackstone ranks second only to
Montesquieu in "frequency of citation in American political writings published between
1760 and 1805").
135. Richard Henry Lee to Governor Edmund Randolph: New York, 16 Oct. 1787, reprinted in FEDERALISTS AND ANTIFEDERALISTS: THE DEBATE OVER THE RATIFICATION OF

THE CONsTrrUTION 152, 154 (John P. Kaminski & Richard Leffler eds., 1989).
136. AN OLD WHG IV, Philadelphia Independent Gazetteer, 27 Oct. 1787, reprinted in
FEDERALISTS AND ANTIFEDERALISTS: THE DEBATES OVER THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 135, at 157, 159.

137. See A.E.

Dick Howard,

THE ROAD

FROM RUNNYMEDE:

MAGNA

CARTA AND

CONSTITUTIONALISM IN AMERICA 270 (1968)

138. In Ingraham v. Wright, the Supreme Court acknowledged that the Due Process
Clause "was intended to give Americans at least the protection against governmental power that they had enjoyed as Englishmen against the power of the Crown." 430 U.S. 651,
672-73 (1977).
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dence this substantive component in the Due Process Clause. From
Union Pacific Railway Co. v. Botsford'39 to Eisenstadt v.
Baird,' 4° the Court has regarded "the right of every individual to
the possession and control of his own person' '' 4' as one of those
rights "essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free
men.' ' 142 The informed consent doctrine was developed to protect
this same "premise of thorough-going self-determination"'43 stemming from the right to bodily integrity. Although the defendants attempted to attack this part of the court's holding on the grounds
that the usual remedy for the violation of informed consent lies in
tort, the court correctly points out that the presence of state action
necessarily implicates the Constitution.'" It is axiomatic that intentional state deprivation of the right to bodily integrity is one of
the very things the Framers sought to prevent by incorporating the
Fifth Amendment, and then the Fourteenth Amendment, into the
Bill of Rights.
2. Contours
In determining whether the court in In re Cincinnati Radiation
Litigation established the contours of the right to bodily integrity
with sufficient particularity to defeat the defendants' qualified immunity defense, this Comment will examine: 1) the purpose of the
qualified immunity doctrine, and 2) the history of the right to
bodily integrity.
As an initial matter, it must be remembered that the qualified
immunity doctrine is not a creation of statute or a constitutional
guarantee; it is simply a pragmatic judicially-created compromise
balancing the conflicting goals of protecting individual rights and
ensuring governmental effectiveness.' 4 The qualified immunity
doctrine seeks to encourage officials to exercise freely their discretionary functions without fear of suit for every mistake in judg-

139. 141 U.S. 250 (1891).
140. 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972) (stating that "if the right or privacy means anything, it
is the right of the individual . . . to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusions
into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget
a child).
141. Union Pacific Railway, 141 U.S. at 251.
142. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923).
143. Natanson v. Klein, 350 P.2d 1093, 1104 (Kan. 1960).
144. See supra notes 85-87 and accompanying text.
145. See, e.g., Davis v. Sherer, 486 U.S. 183, 195 (1984).
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ment.' 4 Additionally, it aims to avoid needless litigation expenses
and ensure that competent, qualified people enter government. 47
Only to the extent that these goals are fostered does the qualified
immunity doctrine retain its validity.
In In re Cincinnati Radiation Litigation, none of these policies
would be served by shielding the defendants from liability. First,
finding the defendants liable for their violation of the plaintiffs'
bodily integrity would not discourage officials from exercising their
discretionary functions. Informed consent is now required from all
human subjects in clinical studies. Unlike Fourth Amendment decisions which have the potential to alter the behavior of the nation's
law enforcement officers, a finding of liability in this case would
not place upon present officials any more duties than they already
have. For the same reason, denying the defendants qualified immunity would also do little to increase the costs of litigation in this
area nor would it divert "official energy from pressing public issues" 48 since the alleged conduct ended twenty-three years ago.
Second, the nature of the right to bodily integrity militates
against an overly "fact-specific" approach to determining whether
the defendants violated a clearly established right.149 The AngloAmerican legal tradition recognized the fundamentality of the right
to bodily integrity"' long before the state acquired either the
means or the motivation to infringe upon it through invasive medical procedures. Only with the growth of industrial urban areas and
the development of modem medicine did the "health and physical
well-being of the population [become] ... one of the essential
objectives of political power."'' Before this time, the state simply
did not concern itself with imposing the structures of medicine
upon its people.'52 This does not mean that the right to bodily
integrity did not exist but only that, in the context of invasive
medical procedures, its intersection with state power did not occur
until the late nineteenth and early twentieth century.

146. See, e.g., Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 814 (1982).
147. Id.
148. Id. at 813.
149. Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 641 (1987) (holding that qualified immunity
requires an "objective (albeit fact-specific)" inquiry whether a reasonable official would
know, "in light of clearly established law," that his conduct was unlawful).
150. See supra notes 131-138 and accompanying text.
151. MICHEL FOUCAULT, POWER/KNOWLEDGE: SELECTED INTERVIEWS AND OTHER WRITINGS 1972-1977, 169-70 (1980).
152. Id. at 166-82.
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Consequently, requiring the plaintiffs to show that the right to
bodily integrity at the time of the radiation experiments was as
particularized as, for example, the Fourth Amendment right to be
free from "unreasonable searches and seizures 153 would simply
place an undue burden upon them)54 From this historical perspective, then, the recognition of an individual's right to bodily integrity against invasive state medical procedures in Jacobson v. Massachusetts... and the boundaries on this right developed in Skin5
sufficiently particularize the
ner,56 Rochin,' 7 and Schmerber"'
right to bodily integrity for the purposes of defeating the
defendants' qualified immunity defense.
C. Nuremberg Code
The court's recognition of the Nuremberg Code as a cognizable
standard for due process protection logically follows from the natural law origins of the right to bodily integrity. Faced squarely with
the issue of what standards were applicable, the Nuremberg Court
looked to "the principles of the law of nations as they result from
the usages established among civilized peoples [and] from the laws
of humanity"'59 Like Blackstone, the justices found the right of
bodily integrity to be one of those rights essential to the concepts

153. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
154. Pervasive state control of the health of its citizens through legally imposed medical
policies and programs has only developed since the turn of the century. In contrast, the
police function has, from the inception of Anglo-American society, been performed by the
state. FOUCAULT, supra note 151, at 170 (stating "that from the heart of the Middle Ages
[the state has] traditionally exercised two great functions: that of war and peace . . . and
that of the arbitration of lawsuits and punishments of crimes, which it ensured through its
control of judicial functions."). In addition, the defendants in In re Cincinnati Radiation
Litigation simply were not faced with the sort of decision at issue in Anderson v.
Creighton. Anderson concerned the reasonableness of a police search under the Fourth
Amendment. 483 U.S. 635, 637 (1987). Police officers must determine in a matter of
moments whether a specific situation justifiably triggers probable cause. Therefore, to
ensure sufficient discretionary freedom, it is arguably necessary to use a more fact-specific
approach to determine whether their actions violate clearly established law. Id. at 641. In
contrast, the defendants in this case carefully planned and executed a research protocol in
an atmosphere informed by Jacobson v. Massachusetts, Rochin v. California, and the
Nuremberg Code. In re Cincinnati Radiation Litig., 874 F. Supp. 796, 817-22 (S.D. Ohio
1995) (Case No. C-1-94-126).
155. 197 U.S. 29 (1905).
156. 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
157. 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
158. 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
159. United States v. Brandt (The Medical Case), 2 Trials of War Criminals Before the
Nuremberg Military Tribunal Under Control Council Law No. 10, 181 (1949).
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of free government, a right that humans inherently possess. To
protect that right, the court decreed that "the voluntary consent of
the human subject [in human experimentation] is absolutely essen-

tial.i

16

More importantly for the purposes of In re Cincinnati Radiation Litigation, the Nuremberg Code served notice to the world that
informed consent was an essential legal requirement of human
experimentation. Given the infamy of the trials, no doctor conducting human experimentation could have been unaware of the requirement of informed consent. The defendants in this case, especially, had to be aware of its requirement. After the Nuremberg
judgment, the Secretary of Defense issued a directive requiring that
human experimentation under the Department's auspices proceed
only under the dictates of the Code. 6' In the years thereafter, the
World Medical Association and the National Institutes of Health
("NIH") issued similar guidelines.' 62 In fact, toward the end of
the radiation experiments, the NIH refused to fund them because of
ethical concerns' 63 and the defendants sought funding elsewhere.
An internal memorandum drafted by a medical ethicist at Cincinnati General Hospital which raised similar ethical concerns" was
also ignored. This evidence clearly demonstrates that the defendants
conducted the experiments in an atmosphere of willful blindness, if
not conscious repudiation, of the dictates of the Nuremberg Code.

160. Id.
161. Paul Barton, Memo May Contradict Pentagon: Note Puts Researchers Under Consent Policy, CINCINNATI ENQUIRER, July 24, 1994, at B1.
162. In re Cincinnati Radiation Litig., 874 F. Supp. 796, 821 (S.D. Ohio 1995) (Case
No. C-1-94-126) (quoting Handbook On The Utilization of Normal Volunteers In The
Clinical Center, Section 3.06, p. 10 (1961)). The NIH guidelines state that their "rigid
safeguards . . . are based on the so-called 'ten commandments' of human medical research which were adopted at the Nuremberg War Crimes Trials." Id.
163. Bonfield, supra note 6, at Al. An internal memo written by the chairman of the
University of Cincinnati's faculty committee on research stated that the NIH rejected funding for the radiation experiments in 1969 because it "questioned the acceptability of the
consent form." Id.
164. In 1967, a member of the University of Cincinnati faculty medical ethics committee recommended in a confidential memo that the radiation experiments end. General
Hospital Radiation Experiments: A Chronology, supra note 4, at A4.
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CONCLUSION

The specter of Nuremberg, of Naziism, should never be carelessly raised and, in this case, it would be unjust to equate the
motives of the defendants in this case with those of the Nazi doctors. The defendants most likely believed that, at the same time
they were furthering the purposes of the state, they were offering
the plaintiffs a last, risky chance at survival that they otherwise
could not afford. However, the defendants' bodies were not irradiated so their motivations were not at issue; only the plaintiffs
should have determined whether that last, risky chance was worth
taking. By concealing the nature of the radiation experiments from
the plaintiffs, the defendants denied them that right.
In In re Cincinnati Radiation Litigation, Judge Beckwith has
correctly determined that this conduct violated the most basic of
our natural rights and the most fundamental of our constitutional
liberties, the right to bodily integrity. She also has correctly concluded that the judicially-created doctrine of qualified immunity
cannot be used to shield the defendants from liability.
However, In re Cincinnati Radiation Litigation has significance
beyond simply redressing the wrongs perpetrated upon the class
action plaintiffs from 1960 to 1972. It represents the first step in
acknowledging the wrongs done to thousands of American citizens
throughout the course of the Cold War. With the initiation of this
case and the opening of the government's files concerning human
experimentation, one hopes that the nation will face the hypocrisy
that could brand an enemy's conduct a barbarity yet view its own
as a necessary expediency-that this will be a lesson learned. One
cannot help but notice, however, that when the files were finally
opened, the Cold War was over.
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